

New Republic

IF RUSSIA SHOULD STRIKE IN THE WEST

By CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART

TRUMAN OR MACARTHUR: THE CHOICE IN ASIA AN EDITORIAL

DIRTY MONEY AND DIRTY POLITICS By LOUISE OVERACKER

**HAROLD L. ICKES: THE PRESIDENT
IS STILL PRESIDENT**

WHICH POLITICAL PARTY HAS LED THE DRIVE TO HALT COM- MUNISM IN THE US?

Do Democrats or Republicans lead in the number of votes cast in support of Anti-Communist measures? What are the startling facts revealed in a survey recently compiled by a special Senatorial committee and as yet unreleased to the public?

(For answer, see page 9 in the September 4th issue of the NEW REPUBLIC)

WHAT IS THE REAL CONDITION OF WESTERN EUROPE'S DEFENSE SYSTEM?

Just how capable are the present Allied occupying forces of withstanding an invasion of Western Europe? Must we rearm Germany in an effort to fortify Europe against a possible all-out "hot" war?

(For answer, see page 14 in the August 28th issue of the NEW REPUBLIC)

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(For answer, see page 12 in the August 21st issue of the NEW REPUBLIC)

WHY ARE OUR STOCKPILES OF CRITICAL MATERIALS SO LOW?

Is it due to negligence on the part of the Administration? To the fact that some materials are extremely scarce and can't be had at any price? Or is there another, more sinister reason for the present shortage of vital supplies?

(For answer, see page 8 in the September 4th issue of the NEW REPUBLIC)

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WASHINGTON WIRE

THE 81ST CONGRESS is about through. Early next week, House and Senate should agree on terms for leaving Washington after two years. This Congress added 10 million people to Social Security, ended the margarine tax, performed several other useful functions and passed a rash of last-minute war legislation. Yet its final record is disappointing. Hopes had soared high with Truman's unexpected election victory in 1948; the overturn of the reactionary GOP 80th Congress seemed for a brief minute to mean a new era. Instead, GOP-Dixiecrat control in the 81st has preserved the status quo.

Why did it turn out that way? Basically, because Congress is chosen by a different electorate from that which chooses the President. The American voter can—and usually does—insist on a liberal President. But the machinery is rigged against liberalism when it comes to Congress. Most voters don't know the name of their own Representative. The Congressman is dominated by minority pressure groups in his own district, and after he gets to Washington he finds little party discipline to curb him. Also, archaic rules block majority action: for example, both parties had solemn pledges for civil-rights legislation in their 1948 platforms, yet nothing was done. This is the sort of thing that produces voter cynicism. It also helps to explain that basic paradox in American life: a population that is, in the main, pretty forward-looking, and a legislature that generally seems like a dragging anchor.

A lot of anxious, humble people got a real uplift last week listening to Harry Truman outlining to them, simply and quietly, America's aims in Korea. The US is squarely behind the United Nations, and on the whole our record is one to be prayerfully proud of. Truman put it in terms the world can understand, and he did so without cant or breast-beating. His words were terribly important. We are in this world conflict

to stay, he said. If Soviet Russia wants war, the responsibility is on her. Furthermore, America is at last prepared to make appropriate sacrifices for the business in hand.

On the political side, if things go well in Korea, the Democrats may profit in the fall elections. The next week or so should tell the story. There is the possibility that if the North Korean tide can be turned, it may recede very fast. Perhaps such things shouldn't affect elections, but they do.



General MacArthur's message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars that set off all the fireworks was sent

as a private communication, using the Signal Corps tele-communications. The General chose to send it that way. Since it was treated as a private letter from MacArthur to the VFW head, nobody saw it at the Pentagon save the clerk in the signal center. Meanwhile MacArthur's efficient Tokyo publicity staff sent copies to leading US publishers, with a personal covering letter from him. A fantastic situation developed. While most of the press knew about it, responsible officials didn't get the news till August 25. President Truman himself didn't hear about it till next day, after a reporter had asked a White House staff member about the "new Formosa policy." It must have been a unique occasion when Truman read the MacArthur copy aloud to startled General Bradley, Secretary Johnson, Secretary Acheson and others, after the morning military briefing at the White House August 26. None of the three had known of the statement. Without waiting for comment, Truman said, quietly and evenly, to Johnson, "Louis, I want you to direct General MacArthur to withdraw that statement."

US generals may eventually get the idea that their job is with the Army and not setting basic foreign policy. Major General Anderson, commandant of the Air War College, Montgomery, Alabama, has been suspended in the latest Administration answer to these "preventive-war" statements.

School starts for 30 million children this month. They go to crowded schools with underpaid teachers. The average US public-school teacher's salary now is \$2,985, with a prewar purchasing power of only \$1,760. Teachers symbolize the unorganized white-collar workers who are always hit hardest by inflation. They haven't recovered from the last big inflation, and now a new one looms. Can inflation be curbed? Yes, by drastic action. But it must be candidly set down that nothing resembling such action is being taken in Washington.

Lacking federal allocation of scarce materials, giant corporations are doing it themselves. The Aluminum Corporation of America, for example, is at once a producer of primary aluminum and a fabricator of aluminum after it is produced. When a scarcity develops, Alcoa naturally gives first call to its own fabricating plants, and only later to its competitors. So it is in other areas. This "voluntary" system of allocation is a substitute for federal controls. Its tendency is to make the big corporations bigger.

Notes. By 183 to 175, after a violent battle, the House indicted defiant witness Edward A. Rumely, head of the Committee for Constitutional Government, in a test case to see whether crypto-fascist outfits will be treated as severely for contempt as their left-wing counterparts. . . . Lee Pressman is the latest to renounce Communism, this time over Korea; somehow we can never get very enthusiastic over these repentant sinners. . . . Hearing-aids sell for \$200, cost about \$20; eye-glasses are picked up at Woolworth's and self-fitted because poor people can't afford proper ones at exorbitant prices: these facts are presented to Congressional committees even as the American Medical Association blocks a bill for federal aid to medical education. . . . Congress is likely to make this year's experimental "omnibus" appropriation bill the last. . . . Looks like a good chance to beat Taft in Ohio. . . . Congress made no financial conditions whatsoever on the \$62.5 million loan to Spain, just told Franco, "Come and get it."

Washington

T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

No Authority

SIR: To Dr. Martin Gumpert and to all who may be disposed to take seriously his tirade against *Dianetics* (the *NR*, August 14) I commend the words of advice attributed to Oliver Cromwell: "I beseech ye, in the bowels of Christ, to consider whether ye may not be mistaken." In vain I warned the Literary Editor of the *NR* a month ago NOT to submit this book to review by an "Authority" unwilling to put its postulates to a test. Dr. Gumpert has not only put them to no test, but has carefully refrained from asking the Hubbard Dianetic Research Foundation in Elizabeth, New Jersey, for documentary evidence and case studies—now being prepared for later publication. He also "hopes to prevent" others from testing the postulates and believes (shades of the AMA on socialized medicine!) that dianetics should be "prohibited."

Happily, his efforts will be futile. The only thing "dangerous" or disgraceful in this matter is that the *New Republic* should print such utterly ignorant and irresponsible statements, under the editorial delusion that they constitute a critical evaluation, and thereby make itself the laughingstock of the rapidly growing throng of people who know what dianetics is about. Not the book, but the review, is "complete nonsense," a "paranoiac system" and a "fantastic absurdity." There are no authorities on dianetics save those who have tested it. All who have done so are in no doubt whatever as to who is here mistaken.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williamstown, Mass.

[While Dr. Schuman is a distinguished authority on political science, we do not feel that on issues involving psychiatry he is entitled to any more respect than any other layman. His suggestion that no one should write about dianetics without having experienced it seems to us like saying that no one can be an authority on cyanide of potassium unless he has eaten some. — THE EDITORS]

A New Deal for the Peasant

SIR: In Korea the cold war has now become hot, but there are large parts of the Far East, as well as the Middle East, Western Europe and Africa, where the temperature is still low enough to allow whatever violence that does occur to be regarded as civilian insurrection rather than out-and-out war. This is no reason for us to think that the struggle is any less important or any less in need of a plan of campaign than if formal declarations of war had been made.

Of the two main reasons today why

we are prepared to fight any kind of war, one is purely self-interest, so that we can keep open and enlarge our trade lines, or, rather more farsightedly, because we believe that our own territorial integrity can best be safeguarded by stopping aggression before it reaches our own frontiers. The other reason is idealistic—because we believe in the rights of free peoples to order their own affairs, and because we are prepared to go even to the length of war for that belief.

By whichever of these reasons we are moved, we cannot succeed unless we have the wholehearted support of the people for whom we are fighting; and we cannot have their support unless we know who they are and what their legitimate aspirations may be. These people—potential allies or potential enemies depending on how we behave—naturally have many differences, ranging as they do from Indo-China to West Africa, and from Malaya to Western Europe; but they have one thing in common: they are all dependent to a greater or lesser extent on the soil for their livelihood, and they share the problems common to peasants throughout the world.

This fact was realized long ago by the Communists: . . . Russia's main line of attack in the cold war thus far has been to promise to the peasant what he most wants. In France, for instance, he wants lower taxes and he fears a fall in prices due to foreign competition and particularly Marshall Plan aid. The Communist propaganda in rural areas shouts for a reduction in the burden which the state imposes on the peasant, defends the maintenance of high prices to the producer (in spite of the fact that the party line of the towns is for a reduction in food prices) and points out that the inevitable effect of the Marshall Plan will be the dumping of American surpluses in France to the detriment of the home producer.

In Italy land hunger is one of the outstanding features of the agrarian picture, and here Communists have an easy task in convincing the half-starved pieceworker of the South, the prosperous share-cropper of the Center, and the comparatively wealthy agricultural worker of the Po Valley, that all their complaints would be met if the large estates were taken over from their present absentee owners and redistributed in small parcels among the people who actually do the work.

In China and Korea we have seen the practical effects of the Communist agrarian policy, and there are many other key areas where the danger is just as great—above all in Persia, where the land is still owned by a wealthy few and the work is done by a poverty-stricken peasantry. Africa has not yet emerged sufficiently from its tribal state for the problem to have become as acute as in

(Continued on page 23)



TRUMAN OR MacARTHUR—THE CHOICE IN ASIA

AT THE HEIGHT of the Wilderness campaign, Lincoln sought to learn Grant's intentions.

Grant, deadlocked in Spotsylvania, answered: "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

This year the political battles seem to be forming around the President's policy in Asia and the policy into which General MacArthur is pushing the Republican Party.

We suggest that in this conflict the President's lines are strong, and that if he holds them in Grant's spirit he will win.

The American people recognize that we are close to war with China, and that MacArthur's challenge to the President, political in its timing, its spirit, its method of presentation, might have brought us still closer. They resent the efforts of Republicans to blow up MacArthur's challenge and the President's response into a political battle. They know that it is dangerous to kick around a live bomb as a football in a political campaign.

Americans further fear and resent the efforts of generals to usurp the authority of the elected representatives of the people. They believe, as General Eisenhower declared in 1948, that "nothing in the international or domestic situation especially qualifies for the most important office in the world a man whose adult years have been spent in the country's military forces."

For General MacArthur, whose efforts to win the Republican nomination proved him to be politically a child, these words ring doubly true.

MacArthur's friends have thrown up the usual barrage of clichés to cover his retreat. As campaign tempers mount, they may succeed in obscuring the issue. Yet the President in his radio talk has made it clear that between himself and MacArthur basic disagreements exist on which the voters must choose in November.

First: Shall we act alone or with our allies?

Fourteen democratic nations—Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Britain, Switzerland, Israel, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia—have recognized Communist China. The natural consequence of recognition is that these nations will support China's entry into the UN and also her claim to Formosa. All of them have been alarmed and antagonized by our unilateral stand in Formosa. They agree with the words of a British Conservative MP, Peter

Baker: "We will not burn our fingers in the strange cauldron which General MacArthur seems to be brewing in Formosa."

The reasoning of these nations is not derived from appeasement or commercial pressures. It is that the unity of the Communist world must be broken up, and that China is the place to start.

India above all is committed to this view. Her basic policy is to oppose aggression. Her commonwealth ties are strong. Her determination to be neutral is stronger still. Her program of Asia for the Asiatics centers on a long-range alliance with Communist China. Nehru believes that a hostile China, subservient to Russia, will advance through Indo-China, Burma, Nepal and Ceylon to India's borders, and that it will arm India's Communists in preparation for eventual war. He believes that China wants to be independent and peaceful, and that an alliance with India will give to Mao the strength he needs to assert his independence. On these assumptions, India is working very closely to localize the Korean war, and to settle it without weakening the UN or undermining China's vital interest in the Korean-Manchurian border.

All these considerations MacArthur totally ignores in seeking to take over a part of China as an American "bastion" in order that we may easily "dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore." His political comment is that: "It is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership." Nothing could be farther from the truth, as the angry reaction of the Indian press to his proposals clearly demonstrates.

In contrast, President Truman, after acting alone in an emergency, has done his utmost, by welcoming UN action, to transform our unilateral commitment into a common stand. As he said last Friday, "We believe in the United Nations. When we ratified its Charter, we pledged ourselves to seek peace and security through this world organization. . . . We are working for peace constantly in the United Nations and in all the capitals of the world."

For MacArthur the Pacific is a "vast moat to protect" the US from the Asiatic mainland. Truman asserts in contrast that in a conflict with Russia, if Europe is undefended and the Asiatic mainland is hostile, a vast moat will be little protection.

Second: *Do we rely on force or law?*

By law, we mean respect for the precedents of traditional US foreign policy, for the commitments made by ourselves and our allies, for the Charter of the United Nations.

For more than half a century US policy toward China has been based on defense of her territorial and administrative integrity, and non-interference in her internal affairs. It is a sound policy. And one great test and distinction of the democracies in today's conflict is their capacity to hold to basic principles against shifting political pressures.

Our present commitments are equally clear. We reaffirmed at Cairo and at Potsdam that Formosa was a part of China, whose claim dates from the fourteenth century. The counter-claims of Chiang, in the long run, are on a par with those of the pirate Coxinga who claimed Formosa for the shattered Ming dynasty 300 years ago.

Finally, we are committed by membership in the UN to take to that body for collective and orderly settlement all disputes that threaten the peace.

The President has felt bound by these commitments. He has insisted that the US has no territorial ambitions in China. He has based our opposition to Russia on her appropriation of North China, Manchuria and Sinkiang. He has centered the conflict in the UN, contrasting our support of the Charter with its defiance by the Communists.

Says the President: "We do not want Formosa or any part of Asia for ourselves. We believe that the future of Formosa, like that of any other territory in dispute, should be settled peacefully. We believe that it should be settled by international action and not by the decision of the United States or any other state alone. The mission of the Seventh Fleet is to keep Formosa out of the conflict. Our purpose is peace, not conquest."

MacArthur, on the other hand, advances a military program for US expansion in Asia. It places us on the same level as the Russians in grabbing parts of China. It ignores the UN. It isolates us in the UN, where China, if she avoids aggression, is likely in the not too distant future to gain majority support for her right to UN membership and her claim to Formosa.

Third: *Will we reënter China's civil war?*

In violation of our traditional policy of non-interference, the US was drawn onto the losing side of the Chinese civil war. In supporting the Kuomintang we lost the support of the Chinese people to whom it had become a hated symbol of oppression and corruption.

Following the flight of the Kuomintang from the mainland, the US reverted to its traditional policy, ready to oppose aggression by the Chinese Communists, ready

to help China if she would permit help to be given.

President Truman insisted that to neutralize Formosa was not to defend it, and that to oppose both Communist attacks on Formosa and Nationalist attacks on China was not to reënter China's civil war. "We hope," the President said, "that the people of China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the United Nations and against the American people, who have always been and still are their friends. Only the Communist imperialism, which has already started to dismember China, could gain from China's involvement in the war. The Communist imperialists are the only ones who can gain if China moves into this fight."

The Nationalists accepted neutralization as a first step and undertook at once to convert it into a full alliance. They had a great deal of pressure to apply, for by forbidding the Nationalists to take action which they insisted was necessary to prevent a successful invasion, such as bombing the Communist fleet in mainland harbors, the United States, while disclaiming responsibility for Formosa's defense, actually accepted ultimate responsibility.

In his visit to Formosa, MacArthur played right into the Nationalists' hands. He established his own direct liaison, supplied fuel while the Nationalists were violating Truman's order, brought over land-based jet planes on demonstration flights, and posed with Chiang in attitudes of adulation which the world press condemned. General Chen Cheng, the Nationalist Premier, at once denounced the neutralization policy. Chiang declared that he and MacArthur had laid the foundation for "Sino-American military coöperation" to continue until victory over Communism in Asia was assured. Chiang has made it clear that he sees Formosa as the base of an attack on the mainland, carried through with our weapons, our planes, our troops. Spokesmen for MacArthur such as Senator Knowland concede that this is their ambition by referring to the Nationalist regime as "the Republic of China now temporarily on Formosa."

To offset these pressures the President has declared that the Seventh Fleet will not patrol the Formosa Straits after the Korean war is settled. It seems clear that his neutralization policy, limited in length and referred to the UN without prejudice to Formosa's future status, may still avoid war with China.

In contrast, MacArthur's policy of building Formosa, in alliance with Chiang, as the base of a future invasion of the mainland, must force China and the United States into a war.

It would be the most costly, useless, unpopular and catastrophic war in our history. The American people want none of it. If the Republican Party commits itself to such a reckless gamble with American principles and American lives, it will receive a sound and well-deserved beating.

THE WEEK

THE WAR IS IN POLITICS

The outlines of the 1950 Congressional campaign, now going into its last two months, are finally becoming sharp. The Republicans have taken their stand on what they claim is the failure of Administration policy in Asia. Guy Gabrielson, chairman of the Republican National Committee, has hastily thrown together a 56-page news release, entitled "Background to Korea," prepared "for the use of Republican candidates and workers in the campaign to elect the 82nd Congress." Primarily a summary of views expressed by various Republican members on the floor of Congress, the report ends with the statement of the Republican minority on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, issued August 14, blaming the Administration for "failure in 1945 to recognize the true aims and methods of the rulers of Soviet Russia."

The Democrats will defend their own position by pointing out how much worse off the country would be if the Republicans had had their way on military and foreign-policy issues since the end of the war. Senator Millard Tydings (Md.), one of the canniest politicians in the Democratic Party, unveiled the Administration line in opening his campaign for another term. Blasting at Republican isolationism, Senator Tydings charged that if the country had accepted the GOP position on defense for the last five years, "we should be impotent today."

Tydings pointed out that Republicans voted overwhelmingly against aid for Korea before the war broke out there, following "the course recommended by the Communist *Daily Worker*." He cited the voting record of Senator Kenneth S. Wherry (R, Nebr.), "the Republican leader in the United States Senate," who voted to cut arms aid for Greece and Turkey, opposed extension of Selective Service in 1948, voted to cut military aid to America's allies in 1949, and opposed an authorization for foreign economic aid, including aid to China.

"Before World War II," Tydings

said, "a majority of the Republicans in the Senate voted against acquiring critical and scarce materials such as rubber, tin, etc., for stockpiling. They voted against selective service a few months before Pearl Harbor, and many other needed measures."

"This is a sorry record but it is one that the Republicans will have to explain. I intend to recount it from every platform in the State of Maryland." Many another Democrat will be doing the same thing in his own state.

NO ECONOMIC FREEZE

President Truman is still convinced that there is no need for a general economic freeze to sustain the degree of mobilization needed to prosecute the Korean war. He has no intention of using immediately a large part of the authority Congress has given him in the defense-production act. The President believes that tight control of credit, plus higher wages, will be more effective against inflation than general price controls, and he is more likely to ask Congress to impose more taxes, if inflation moves forward this fall, than he is to apply price and wage ceilings across the board.

The likelihood is that no consumer price ceilings at all will be set within the next few months, and that there will be no rationing. And, for the present, the President plans to administer defense-production controls entirely through existing government departments instead of creating new agencies.

The Department of Commerce under Secretary Charles Sawyer, the businessman's protector in the Cabinet, will be given the biggest part of the limited job that is to be undertaken. Sawyer will establish a defense-production agency inside his department and administer priorities and allocations of scarce materials and supplies. At the head of that agency will be General William Harrison, president of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company, who will be responsible for the distribution of every essential commodity except fuel, to be allocated by Secretary of

the Interior Oscar Chapman, and food, which will be in the hands of Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan.

Secretary Sawyer and General Harrison intend to operate largely on a voluntary basis, leaving it to industry to work out the division of critical materials as between military and non-military uses.

The Commerce Department will not rely on self-regulation to control inventories, however. No action will be taken at the moment against household hoarders, but an official order forbidding businesses to accumulate more than normal stocks will be issued at once. Industrial hoarders who are caught run the risk of a \$10,000 fine and a year in jail.

The President's Economic Advisers are counting on a little-publicized section of the new defense-production act to supply a powerful brake on inflation. Title III of the law gives the President broad authority to finance expansion of production by underwriting bank loans, making direct loans to industry to expand plants and develop new sources of minerals, and to expand plants owned by the government. There will be heavy emphasis on increasing production in a dozen fields this next year.

Consumers will feel the first pinch of the war economy in new curbs that will be placed on installment buying and in the tightening of credit on the purchase of real estate and other investments. Payments will be raised and the period for buying on time shortened to approximately the old wartime levels.

If it soon appears that this partial approach to mobilizing the economy is insufficient to check inflation and increase production, the President will find it difficult to move into gradual control of prices and wages under the authority he has been given. The defense-production act requires that whenever price ceilings are imposed, ceilings must be imposed at the same time on the wages paid to the producers of those items. This provision will raise so many questions that there will be a general reluctance to bring any new product under control. No practical price controls are possible on food. Under the law, ceiling

prices on farm products below parity are prohibited. Since most farm prices are well below parity, food prices would have to rise very substantially above present levels before ceilings could be established. The President's lawyers have already begun studying the present price law to determine how it needs to be amended in order to work.

THE WOOD BILL WON'T WORK

On August 29, 12 years and two months from the day on which Martin Dies persuaded the House of Representatives to start a Red hunt, the House Committee on Un-American Activities fulfilled the hopes of its creators. With the passage of the Wood bill, a carbon copy of the Mundt-Nixon measure that had been urged for years, the House has agreed to a sedition bill more drastic than any legislation proposed in 150 years. Now the Un-American Committee, which has come into considerable disfavor at various times in the past, will presumably have clear sailing in its indiscriminate pursuit of liberals as well as Communists. It will be surprising if the committee fails to set the stage for Red dramas that will make previous hearings look pale.

Only 20 members of the House opposed the drastic Wood "subversive-control" bill; 354 supported it. This was a vote of fear—not of Communists, but of constituents. It showed lack of faith in the strength of our democratic institutions and can only undermine the confidence of the American people in free speech and free association as a bulwark of democracy. Not a member of the House really believes that if the bill becomes law, Communists will come out of hiding and register, or that organizations labeled as subversive will continue to meet openly and will send out literature which would have to be marked as mailed by "a Communist organization." But because this is an election year and there is a war in Korea, the House chose to ignore President Truman's request to take realistic precautions against espionage and sabotage and instead passed a popular measure aimed at something vague and indefinable called "subversion."

The members paid no heed to Rep-

resentative Emanuel Celler's (D, N.Y.) warning that the bill was "inept, non-constructive, and unconstitutional. . . . You might formally wipe out the party but the evil would remain. The Communist cells and cadres would go underground. The groups would become like chameleons—change color and form quite readily." Celler urged passage of the President's bill to tighten existing espionage laws, but debate on this milder measure was limited to five minutes, during which not a single Administration leader took the floor for it. It met defeat by a vote of 153 to 64.

Representative Rankin (D, Miss.), with his usual reasoning, said "Communism is out not only to destroy our form of government but also to destroy the Christian religion," and thereupon read a list of names of persons who have been arrested on charges of espionage (without the help of the Mundt-Nixon bill), concluding, "There is not a single Christian or a single white Gentile among these Communists."

The events of the week seemed especially timed to benefit the 1950 model Martin Dies, Republican Representative Richard Nixon, who has been hard up for publicity in his race for the Senate from California against Democratic Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas. The appearance of Lee Pressman at the Un-American Activities Committee, on Nixon's invitation, coincided with the opening of serious campaigning in California. His GOP colleagues added to Nixon's propaganda by interrupting the Wood bill debate to parade to the well of the House eulogizing the Californian for his part in framing the bill. Mrs. Douglas, however, pointed out that under present administrative machinery for screening disloyal persons "the top leaders of the Communist Party have been tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison. . . . I will not sacrifice the liberty of the American people on an altar of hysteria erected by those without vision, without faith, without courage, who cringe in fear before a handful of crackpot, traitorous, Communist cronies."

If this bill should pass the Senate and be enacted into law, it would take years to set up an official roster of Communists or Communist organizations. The Subversive Activities Con-

trol Board could not issue an order requiring registration until hearings under the terms of the Administrative Procedures Act had been concluded. There could follow a review by the United States Court of Appeals, and, by writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court. This could take two or three years. The Supreme Court has said (in *Thomas v. Collins*): "If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think this can be accomplished by the device of requiring previous registration as a condition for exercising them and making such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance their exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining order."

Representative Usher Burdick (N. Dak.), one of two Republicans who opposed the bill, was shouted down when he attempted to have it sent back to committee. Those opposing final passage of the bill: Republicans Burdick and Javits (N. Y.), Marcantonio (ALP, N. Y.), and 17 Democrats: Aspinall (Colo.), Biemiller (Wis.), Blatnik (Minn.), Bosone (Utah), Carroll (Colo.), Celler (N. Y.), Chudoff (Pa.), Dollinger (N. Y.), Douglas (Calif.), Eberharter (Pa.), Havenner (Calif.), Huber (Ohio), King (Calif.), Multer (N. Y.), O'Brien (Mich.), O'Hara (Ill.) and Shelley (Calif.).

NEW FIGHT AGAINST CLOSURE

In these closing days of the 81st Congress, 11 Senators have introduced an amendment to Senate Rule 22, the Wherry closure rule which has blocked two attempts to bring civil-rights legislation to a vote this session. Under the present rule, which requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds of all members of the Senate, it has proved impossible to limit debate. In offering the new rule, Senator Herbert Lehman (D, N.Y.), one of the authors of the amendment, pointed out that "the requirement that 64 affirmative votes must be cast in order to bring up a measure for debate is undemocratic and un-American—it represents legislative self-paralysis."

The sponsors of the legislation are concerned with more than civil-rights measures. "Were we to face a critical legislative need upon which the safety

and security of our whole nation depended, a handful of Senators could make it impossible for the Senate even to take up that legislation," Lehman said. The new proposal consists of two parts: the first would provide for closure by a vote of two-thirds of those present and voting, after two days' debate. This section would be invoked only for legislation in a national emergency, when the overwhelming preponderance of the Senate desired speedy action. The second section would make closure possible after 15 days of debate by a vote of a simple majority of those present and voting.

"The 15-day period of debate," Lehman explained, "is provided in order that Senators in a minority position on an issue will have ample opportunity to appeal to public sentiment and to arouse public support for their position."

The proponents do not expect the proposal to be adopted at this session. It has been referred to the Senate Rules Committee and if Congress returns after the November elections, the sponsors are hopeful that there will be time for full hearings and consideration.

CITED FOR CONTEMPT

Dr. Edward A. Rumely and Joseph Kamp—two big-time neo-fascist propagandists—and William L. Patterson, Negro head of the Civil Rights Congress, have been cited for contempt of Congress for refusing to answer questions of the House Lobby Investigating Committee. It is not a new experience for either Rumely, executive secretary of the Committee for Constitutional Government, or Kamp, vice-chairman of the Constitutional Educational League. Both have been tried on similar charges in the federal courts. Rumely was acquitted by a trial jury; Kamp was convicted and is now serving four months in jail.

The House voted, 183 to 175, to cite Rumely for contempt after he refused to tell the Lobby Committee, headed by Representative Frank Buchanan (D, Pa.), how his \$500,000-a-year Committee for Constitutional Government is financed. Rumely's organization has published many thousands of copies of anti-labor, anti-public-welfare books and pamphlets. He refused to tell the committee who has contributed funds to produce and distribute this propaganda

literature. Prominent Republican Representatives, including Charles Halleck (Ind.), minority whip in the House, and Joseph Martin (Mass.), minority leader, defended Rumely. When the vote was taken, the Democrats, with the exception of a few Southerners, voted solidly for the contempt citation, and the Republicans opposed it.

The House also voted, 238 to 106, to cite Patterson, over the vigorous protest of Representative Vito Marcantonio (ALP, N. Y.). Patterson had refused to tell the committee whether he is a member of the Communist Party. The vote on Kamp was 215 to 155. The three men, if convicted, could be fined \$100 to \$1,000, and sent to jail for one to 12 months.

SOUTH CAROLINA RACE WAR

Around 8 p.m. on August 26, the Ku Klux Klan started gathering outside Happy Hill, a Negro dance hall near Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, a fashionable summer resort for white people. One of the Klansmen told Charles Fitzgerald, owner of the night club, that there was too much noise, and the KKK left. Fitzgerald called Sheriff Ernest Sasser and the Chief of Police of Myrtle Beach to warn them of the trouble that would ensue if the Klansmen should return. A few minutes later the KKK marched back and, during the battle that followed, a Klansman was killed. When his white robe was removed, he was identified as James D. Johnston, a Myrtle Beach policeman. He was wearing his uniform under his Klan robe.

Sheriff Sasser has arrested the Grand Dragon of the KKK in South Carolina, Thomas L. Hamilton, charging him with "conspiracy to stir up mob violence." Charges had already been brought against Hamilton in connection with a Klan parade the week before near Myrtle Beach.

Walter White, executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, reports that this KKK demonstration is the third in recent weeks and "appears to be part of an organized campaign to drive Negroes from the area." Fitzgerald owns a motor court, a hotel, a taxicab business and several concessions at Happy Hill and Atlantic Beach. White points out that Atlantic Beach, owned entirely by Negroes, is considered a more desirable beach site than Myrtle Beach, owned by whites. It is sandwiched between Ocean Drive and Windy Hill Beach, and the Klan has made several expeditions there recently, "apparently trying to drive Negroes from this valuable property."

Although much of the recent mob violence in the South has been quietly ignored by local police officers, who have refused to cooperate with the FBI to obtain names of white persons involved, this is perhaps the first case in which there is unquestioned evidence of police participation in KKK activities. The NAACP has asked the Department of Justice to investigate the incident under Title 18, Section 242, of the US Criminal Code, which makes it a federal offense "to go upon the highway in disguise to deny any right or privilege secured by the Constitution of the United States."



SEPTEMBER MORN

OUTSIDE AMERICA

The British Labour Party's policy statement, "Labour and the New Society," ran into a crossfire of criticism. On the Right flank, not only the Conservatives but also the Liberals were harsh. The Manchester *Guardian* referred to "the familiar mixture of subsidy and cajolery, elevating inadequate improvisations into permanent policies," and said it was a pity that the Labour moderates "have not yet found a realistic modern policy." On the Left flank, the Labour radicals were no less unkind. The *New Statesman* said the statement "repeats the lofty abstractions so familiar at garden fêtes" and that "there are many problems between us and the New Society which this document makes no real attempt to tackle."

The novelty of the policy statement in the field of foreign affairs was a proposal that ECA be replaced, on its termination in 1952, by a "world plan for mutual aid" whose object would be "to attack poverty everywhere." The *Guardian* commented:

Proper handling may make this pompous proclamation the beginning of a useful initiative by the British Government. But the scheme will have to be much more closely defined before it begins to stir enthusiasm.

The *New Statesman* wrote:

It is proper for a Labour Government to try to take the lead in this: the only political answer to Communism is adequate development of colonial and backward areas in partnership with their peoples. But Labour must be a good deal more specific about this plan if it is to have any hope of success.

Le Monde of Paris, the rightist newspaper which often speaks for the French government and which has become in its own way the most influential in the country, said, "The Labour project seems to suffer in its conception from a troubling gigantism." It went further, and attacked the basic assumption of the project that "rising standards of living are the strongest defense against infil-

tration by Communism and Fascism." This, *Le Monde* said, was a meaningless slogan based on an illusion.

This type of criticism reveals the width of the gulf between the fundamental attitudes of the present British and French governments. It shows the seriousness of the problems of Western European unity at a time when, according to the Labour statement, "military preparedness and economic development are part of a single plan for defending the whole free world." It puts into focus the real significance of "Labour and the New Society."

The document, for all its vaguenesses and inadequacies, reflects the realization on the part of the Labour moderates that while the present British government is moving toward greater political and military coöperation with France and the rest of Western Europe, it finds itself in increasing economic isolation. The document says:

We do not expect all the countries with which we coöperate to be Socialist. All we ask is that they should have sufficient mastery over their own economic systems to fulfil their obligations in international planning.

A few days after the policy statement was issued, the Labour Party announced acceptance of an invitation from Marshal Tito's National Front to send an official delegation to Belgrade. The last previous invitation to be accepted was Marshal Stalin's in July, 1946, at a time when hopeful British democratic Socialists could still believe that Soviet Russia was essentially a socialist country.

No one can really believe that Yugoslavia is now a socialist country by any Western standards. Its National Communism has nothing in common with the welfare state. Its National Front is totalitarian. Its civil liberties don't exist. Most of its Socialist leaders are in exile. Their organization has been officially recognized by the International Conference of Socialist Parties. The president of the Yugoslav Socialist Party in Exile was one of the signers of the petition presented at Strasbourg on behalf of delegates from Eastern European countries, asking that they be allowed to participate in the work of the Council of Europe.

The meaning of the Labour policy statement is that the moderates of La-

bour are trying to face the facts of the world as it is. Those facts dictate Labour's making certain sacrifices at home and taking certain risks abroad. The sacrifices are the dropping of various nationalization projects in order to hold on to the basic principle of planning. The risk is the effort to find allies in such an unlikely place as the Balkans.

The British Labour moderates recognize that not one of the major drives toward unity of part or all of the world is based upon its own economic principles. Socialism has no part in the Soviet's Cominformism; in America's Atlantic Community; in Vatican City's Christian Europe; in the European Right's notion of federation within the Atlantic Community, or the European Right's notion of isolationist neutralism.

The New Statesman doesn't tell the whole story when it describes "Labour and the New Society" as an "attempt to find a policy which fits equally with the present mood of the British electorate and with the future prospects of British economy." Nor does the document set forth this whole story clearly. It's true of course, as it says, that "paying for defense is bound to limit the money available for social services and tax reduction." But it's also true that the crying need of British economy is to create new wealth for the whole country. And this must be done without sacrificing the principle that a rising standard of living for ordinary men is the key to the high morale needed in the use of the new arms intended to defend the free world. The task therefore is to save the bases of the welfare state at a time when the economic mood of most of the governments of the rest of the world puts the British government's program into isolation.

The force of events has made this program a lonely outpost of reform in a spreading wilderness of reaction. But British Labour moderates recognize that Britain's democratic Socialism, while accepting temporarily something short of the whole program of progress at home, cannot content itself with strategic retreat and passive defense abroad. Britain's welfare state can no longer hope to survive as a solitary defender of forward-looking planning in a world of backward-moving free enterprise.

PERCY WINNER

DIRTY MONEY AND DIRTY POLITICS

AN ASTUTE STUDENT of politics once said: "No people can be free who do not

maintain the privilege of paying their own bills." Yet Americans not only are not paying their own bills, but show little interest in who does. The financing of the election campaign of 1948 has never been put under the microscope by an investigating committee, ugly rumors go the rounds in Washington about the sources from which the Democrats drew some of their support, and limitations which encourage evasion remain upon the statute books.

Democrats were pulled out of the hole financially, it is alleged, by Louis A. Johnson, formerly a director of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Company, who assured wealthy friends that they had nothing to fear from the Truman Administration. Even more serious charges were made in connection with the Kerr natural-gas bill, sponsored by Democrats and passed by Democratic votes, but vetoed by President Truman. It was characterized as a "special-interest coup," put over at the behest of big oil operators who had generously supported the Democratic side.

We know much more about who supported the parties and the candidates in 1944 than we do about who filled our campaign chests in 1948. Following a procedure consistently in use since 1912, special Congressional committees in 1944 filled in many details missing from the reports required of party committees and candidates under the federal Corrupt Practices Act. The Political Action Committee of the CIO and other non-party opinion-molders were closely studied by a House committee. A Senate committee, headed by Theodore F. Green of Rhode Island, assembled data relating to a vast number of party committees, independent organizations and candidates and made available what is probably the most accurate and complete picture ever recorded of the financing of elections in a Presidential-campaign year.

Piecing together the story of the financing of a national campaign in the United States is not easy. In addition to party and non-party political committees carrying on activities in two or more states, money may be raised and spent quite independently by a host of state, county, assembly-district and local committees.

by Louise Overacker

Only those committees operating on behalf of Presidential candidates in two

or more states are required to report regularly to Washington. In addition, candidates for the Senate and House file certain information about what they receive and spend on their final election campaigns.

Obviously, much of the story lies outside these reports. State and local committees are not covered, although what they raise and spend clearly affects the fortunes of national candidates; primary elections and election of delegates to the nominating conventions fall outside the scope of national regulations, although they may be covered by the Corrupt Practices Acts of the respective states; some non-party organizations, whose activities may affect the fortunes of parties and candidates, do not file, claiming that their activities are educational, not political, in character. The omission of such expenses as postage, traveling and telephone service from the reports filed by candidates for the Senate and House, and of funds raised by committees and individuals operating independently of these candidates, leaves other wide gaps in our information.

With the power to go behind the record, call witnesses and use field investigators, many of these gaps can be filled in by a Congressional committee. Equally important is the service such a committee can perform in fitting together pieces of a puzzle which mean nothing separately but become part of a meaningful pattern once they have found their place in the whole. Without the work of a Congressional committee the far-flung activity of "wet" and "dry" groups and others in the Hoover-Smith campaign of 1928 would never have been brought to light; we would not have known, for example, that a single individual gave more than \$170,000 to various anti-Smith groups. It was a Senate committee which publicized the part labor played in financing the second Roosevelt campaign. If there had been no Senate investigation of the 1944 campaign we should not have known that nine members of the Pew family contributed more than \$108,000 to various Republican committees—national, state and county.

Putting together the pieces of this jigsaw puzzle is even more difficult today than it was before 1940, because of certain limitations included in the Hatch Act of that year. Piously proclaiming that "money is the chief source of corruption," Congress added amendments placing a ceiling of \$5,000 upon individual contributions to a political committee and limiting to \$3 million the annual expenditures of any committee operating in two or more states. Since 1940, first by the

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Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act of 1943, and later by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, political contributions by labor organizations have been prohibited.

These limitations, without reducing expenditures, have led to an unfortunate splintering of fund-raising activities. Independent committees have mushroomed. In 1944 they spent twice as much as the Democratic National Committee and four times as much as the Republican National Committee. The \$5,000 limitation upon individual contributions was circumvented with ease. Gifts could be hung on many branches of a family tree, or routed through numerous committees. Sixty members of the du Pont clan contributed more than \$200,000 to various Republican agencies in 1940. By distributing his gifts among committees scattered from the Eastern seaboard to Wyoming, one member of this family gave a total of \$49,000 to the Republican campaign. Nor did the restrictions upon trade unions prevent them from playing an important part in financing the 1944 campaign. By creating Political Action Committees with independent treasuries, CIO unions and their friends invested \$1,300,000 in the campaign. In 1948 the AFL, through a newly created Labor's Educational and Political League, joined the CIO-PAC in raising funds to defeat candidates who had supported the Taft-Hartley Act.

Is it less pernicious for 15 committees working for the same candidate to spend \$15 million than for one to do so? Is any useful purpose served by a prohibition which transfers the expenditure of funds from the CIO or the AFL to organizations coöperating with them?

The 1948 campaign may well have been the costliest in history. We know that in 1944, \$20 million was spent by various interstate agencies. Informed estimates of the total cost of the 1948 election ran as high as \$40 million. Expensive gadgets and soaring price levels tend to boost the cost of campaigning. The \$100,000 which the Republican National Committee is said to have spent to elect Lincoln in 1860 would hardly have paid for three hours of choice radio time on a national hookup in 1948. Each national committee spent more than \$800,000 for air time in 1944.

Rising costs pose serious problems for state and Congressional candidates as well as national committees. Forty years ago a candidate might win handily in a statewide contest in Oregon with an expenditure of \$3,000; today \$40,000 is a conservative estimate, and a recent candidate for the United States Senate spent more than \$64,000. In Eastern industrial states with larger populations the cost may be much higher.

Where does the money come from? Broadly, the funds for a campaign come from candidates, their personal friends, office seekers and officeholders, gamblers and other law-breakers who want protection, other spe-

cial interests, and the public. The relative importance of certain sources of course varies with the time and place. Officeholders are no longer so vulnerable to compulsory assessments; underworld contributions are more important locally than nationally; the Jackson Day dinner of the Democrats is a comparatively painless device; trade unionists nowadays pay their own political bills.

An important change in financial support is reflected in the funds of the two national committees. In 1904, when Theodore Roosevelt opposed Alton B. Parker, much of the \$2 million spent by the Republicans was contributed by corporations in amounts of \$50,000 or more. At that time, two wealthy men gave most of the \$700,000 which financed the Democratic National Committee. Following the revelation of these disturbing facts, contributions from corporations were prohibited. More important, Congress passed laws requiring national party committees to file statements of their contributions and expenditures. By 1928, participation in the financing of the campaign was considerably broader; more than 90,000 individuals contributed to the Democratic National Committee and the impressive number of 140,000 to the Republican. Less reassuring, however, was the role of the large contributor. Half of the Democratic fund was given by 135 supporters in amounts of \$5,000 or more, and contributions of less than \$100 accounted for only 12 percent of the total. On the Republican side, 45 percent of the fund came from 300 persons in amounts of \$5,000 or more, and an insignificant eight percent of the total was contributed in amounts of \$100 or less. Disturbing, also, was the fact that both parties leaned heavily upon bankers and manufacturers.

By the second Roosevelt campaign significant changes could be noted in the financing of the Democratic Party. In 1936, although the National Committee received some large contributions, including one gift of \$102,500 from a Pittsburgh oil man, more than one-third of its funds came from small contributors in amounts of less than \$100. Jackson Day dinners, sale of the "book of the Democratic Convention," commemorating that event, and contributions to a Roosevelt Nominators' Division accounted for most of it. Various labor groups, mainly CIO affiliates, gave \$770,000, including \$250,000 which went directly to the Democratic National Committee. The GOP continued to draw upon traditional sources. Two families, the du Ponts and the Pews, together gave \$1 million of the \$7,760,000 the Republican National Committee received.

The Hatch Act, passed just as the whistle blew for the 1940 Presidential contest, encouraged the decentralization of fund-raising but did not alter the sources of financial support of the parties. Small contributors continued to rally to the Democrats, though in both

1940 and 1944 that party got some money from oil operators. The Republicans went on getting heavy contributions from bankers, manufacturers and wealthy families.

The high cost of campaigning goes higher and Republicans frankly appeal to the large contributor for support. Democrats encourage "peanut" contributions but are suspected of being under financial obligation to "big oil." The problem is one which existing limitations have not solved, and cannot. It is no comfort to a candidate who cannot possibly scrape together \$10,000 from respectable sources, to know that his competitor is limited to \$25,000. The problem is not only that some have too much, but that others have too little. "Ceilings" which encourage special interests to scatter their support far and wide among committees working for the same political ends do not alter the dependence upon those interests. They merely make it harder for Congress, the press and the public to obtain essential facts.

Existing federal regulations of campaign funds have repeatedly been branded as utterly inadequate. With few exceptions, state Corrupt Practices Acts are even less effective. It is high time we changed our attitude toward a problem which strikes at the foundations of our democratic structure, and try to work out a constructive approach. An important first step would be to exploit fully every existing means of assembling data about

the financing of campaigns and to make that information available to every voter. By implementing standing committees of Congress with permanent professional staffs, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 paved the way for systematic, continuous investigation of campaign funds. But in 1948 neither the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration nor the Committee on House Administration, through its respective subcommittees on privileges and elections, took advantage of this opportunity. No summary of the pertinent facts about the financing of the campaign was ever made public. The report of a special committee, headed by Representative Ross Rizley of Oklahoma, was limited to specific charges of illegal and unethical action in certain districts. When we need more publicity, we have less.

Perhaps if we were fully aware of where the campaign dollars come from, we might decide it would be cheaper to pay our own political bills. A system of party membership dues, with some of the revenue flowing back to the state and local organizations, would give the parties a more stable, explicit basis as well as a much more democratic financial support. In some other countries parties are financed largely by dues-paying memberships. If a political organization stands for objectives of real importance to its members, it ought to be worth supporting with dollars as well as with votes.

IF RUSSIA SHOULD STRIKE IN THE WEST

FRANCE, by tradition, geographical position and population, is the main factor in the defense of Western Europe. Can she still fulfill that role, and more effectively than in 1940? That is the basic question which her partners and neighbors are anxiously asking.

by **B. H. Liddell Hart**

Her existing seven divisions, two of which are not yet operative, are a handful compared with the 30 active divisions which she maintained before the last war. In 1939 she trebled that total after mobilization, but could not do so today—when the threat comes from a hostile power which maintains a "peacetime" army four times as big as Hitler had on the eve of war in 1939. What are the prospects that France can build up an army comparable to what she had in 1939? The answer depends on the provision of equipment by the USA, but not only on that.

In the course of a recent very busy two weeks in France, I discussed these problems with a number of leading military and political experts. I had an opportunity of meeting, in particular, the principal members of the Western Union Military Staff, both from France and from other countries. It was encouraging to find the pick of them as fresh-minded and forward-thinking as

their dynamic chief whom I already knew, General de Lattre de Tassigny, the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of Western Europe. It would be more encouraging if they had adequate forces under their leadership and if their planning activity had been matched by a keener sense of reality in political quarters.

The first man I saw in Paris was the new Chief of the French General Staff—General Clément Blanc, a thoroughly sensible, refreshingly frank soldier. On the present situation, a number of the points in our discussion cannot be mentioned, for obvious reasons. But some of his more general views can. He showed some anxiety about American and British proposals that each of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance should specialize in developing particular types of force. While recognizing the economic and broad strategic advantages of such a scheme, he felt that there was a risk of carrying it so far as to leave a country too dependent on outside help that might not be fully available when required, owing to other calls. He considered it essential for France to have "balanced" forces of her own. While she could leave long-range strategic bombing to the Americans, who were best placed to produce and operate the

type of machines required, she must have an effective tactical air force of fighters, for interception, and light bombers, for coöperation with the army.

The experience of 1940 has made the French acutely sensitive to the need of using their own resources to provide their troops with adequate air cover. Although such a policy may not be as economical as a division of roles, it is justified on psychological grounds.

At the same time, General Blanc showed a clear grasp of the need for specialization in another sense. He dwelt on the importance of developing the kind of forces best suited to meet the *primary* need—*defense* against an invasion of the West. It calls for specially organized troops, trained in the most modern defensive methods.

The usual type of army is organized primarily on offensive lines, spends most of its money on equipment for that purpose, and devotes most of its time to attack practices. Peaceful countries have never been able to build such an army in peacetime as well as an aggressive country can. Moreover, this type of army, on the scale they can afford, is less of a match for an invader of superior weight than an army specially designed to fit the initial problem of preventing the aggressor's gaining a quick victory. The present French military chiefs believe in putting "first things first." Their predecessors, in trying to compete with Hitler's menace after the rearmament of Germany had outstripped that of France, wasted much of France's limited resources in trying to build a general-purpose army, and to produce a mass of heavy artillery for an eventual offensive against Germany. If they had concentrated on anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, quick to produce, they would have had a much better chance of checking the German invasion.

General Blanc seemed to feel that, even now, many American and British generals fail to understand the need of giving priority to defense, or what that implies in the way of developing appropriate methods. They are still inclined to think in terms of the later stages of the last war, when they had great strength on the ground and still greater in the air. That enabled them to be the attackers and to operate on narrow fronts. "They don't understand what it means to cover 1,000 kilometers of front"—the distance between the Alps and the North Sea. At best, the number of Allied divisions would be few in proportion to the space, and to the enemy's number, so we must study how to cover the space as effectively and economically as possible. It would be folly to lay out our forces on the luxury standards of 1944. (The

experience of Korea has since underlined this point.)

The problem, as General Blanc emphasized, is to check the advance of a mass of Russian tanks backed by a massive air force. It requires a plentiful provision of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. If we seek to have all-purpose weapons more powerful than the enemy's, they are bound to be so costly that there will not be nearly enough of them to cover the space. There is also, he said, need for new-type divisions of high mobility, capable of operating on wide fronts. They should be mobile across country, and not merely on the road. It would be best if all the vehicles were tracked instead of wheeled, and, although the higher cost is an obstacle, the proportion of such tracked vehicles should be as large as possible.

As mentioned earlier, the French have today only five effective divisions—and those are equipped with out-of-date material—compared with 30 before the war. The smallness of the number is due not only to shortage of equipment but to the one-year conscript service (now to be 18 months), and the way that the mass of the Regulars has been drained away by the troubles in Indo-China.

On the man-power problem, General Blanc said that it should be possible to produce nearly as many active divisions as before the war by an increase in the number of Regulars at home combined with the contemplated extension of service from one year to 18 months. The increase in Regular strength might be obtained by voluntary enlistment for a three-year period. While the pay of the French Regular is still less than that of the British soldier, the French conscript gets practically nothing, so that there is an inducement for young men to embark on a short Regular engagement. (By paying the Regular and the conscript on the same scale, the British government hindered its own efforts to recruit Regulars; this policy was altered on August 30, when the period of conscription was raised from 18 months to two years and pay was increased substantially.)

General Blanc thought it desirable that about half the personnel in the active divisions should be Regulars. In the more technical fighting units, such as tanks and artillery, they should predominate, and even in the infantry be at least fifty-fifty.

On all basic points, General Blanc's views of the kind of forces and tactics required in the defense of the West coincided with those of General de Lattre. That is a good sign, since a divergence of views between the Chief of the French General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Union Land Forces, of which French troops are the main component, would be a dangerous complication. The present harmony on the topmost level is remarkable.

General de Lattre has been described as "theatrical"

This is the second of a series of three articles on the defense of Europe. The third will appear in an early issue.

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, well-known British military expert, served in the First World War and has been military writer and editor for several newspapers and the Encyclopedia Britannica. He is the author of nearly thirty books, most of them in the fields of tactics and strategy.

or as an "opera star," but I have never found the slightest justification for such criticism in my contacts with him. It is not often that a forceful and inspiring personality like his is so free from pomposity and so unpretentious. I had an excellent impression, too, of General Augustin Guillaume, the Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in Germany, with whom I spent a day at Baden-Baden. The present military leaders of France are far more impressive than those who were at the top before the war. The one criticism I should be inclined to make is that they seemed rather too optimistic about the possibility of solving the problem of creating an effective defense, and of having the time to do so. Such hopefulness may have been only the natural and necessary attitude of men who are intent on making the best of a difficult job. But their qualified optimism was in striking contrast to the unqualified pessimism expressed by many officers who have left the army since the war. The facts which they cite are disturbing. It is evident that a great deal will have to be accomplished before their pessimism can justly be regarded as anything more than realism—seeing things as they are.

More disquieting was the manifest tendency in political quarters to avoid looking into the situation, let alone concentrating attention on its needs. An ostrich-like posture was the prevailing attitude in Paris when I was there, just before the invasion of Korea. Hardly anyone to whom I talked would admit the likelihood of war in the near future. One of the few exceptions was Paul Reynaud—the luckless Prime Minister of 1940, who went back into the Cabinet this June and was out of it again within a few days.

While soldiers also seemed to think that there was no imminent danger of war, their view may have been influenced by the fact that Western Union staff planning has been geared to governmental policy under which even the minimum security program could not be completed until 1952. However, since the shock of the Korean crisis a greater sense of urgency has developed in Paris, as in the other capitals of the West. Following the British government's outline proposal to spend \$9.5 billion on defense in the next three years, the French government has submitted to the American government a defense memorandum setting forth a new program which would cost 2,000 milliards of francs (more than \$5.6 billion) in the same period. More specific than the British one, it states that this program would provide for "the formation in three years of 15 new divisions, fully equipped"—presumably bringing the total to 20. That is a big jump compared with what the French were previously contemplating.

But the completion of the expanded program is set three years away, and even if that much time is allowed, it will still be far from providing the number of divi-

sions estimated as necessary to cover a 1,000-kilometer (600-mile) front. This number is now put at 50 for the ready-for-action covering force. The French plainly hint that they will not feel inclined to attempt the effort involved in the new program unless satisfied that it will prove an effective insurance. They emphasize that it will depend not only on additional American aid in money and equipment, but also on additional troop reinforcement by their overseas partners. They dwell on their bitter experience in 1940, and declare: "It is necessary for the United States and Great Britain in particular to share in defense by stationing a sufficient number of divisions in continental Europe."

This shows that the French are now conscious of the fallacy of relying for defense on conscript reservists who have to be called up from civil life after an emergency has arisen. They have been brought to realize that what matters most is active divisions ready for instant action. But they make a demand that will be the more difficult to meet because, after the last war, Britain foolishly copied the French system and adopted peacetime conscription under the mistaken impression that the best insurance against aggression was to have a large mass of reservists available for mobilization.

The British Army is twice as large as before the war yet has fewer than half as many divisions as it did then. It is almost as large as the French Army, and conscripts men for a longer period, yet has produced even fewer than the meager French divisions. It is natural that the French should be puzzled. What they fail to understand is the detrimental effect of their own system, especially when copied by a non-continental country like Britain, with peculiar circumstances and a multiplicity of overseas commitments.

As things stand, it would be difficult for Britain to provide anything like the number of active divisions needed, even with the new and longer period of conscription. If she were to revert to a purely regular army, offering greater inducements to volunteers, a better number of divisions than at present might be provided—but not "sufficient" to bridge the gap in Western Europe. That the US will be able to do much to make up the balance is improbable, now that our forces are so deeply embroiled in the Far East.

The only other present contributors are the Benelux countries. What could they do? After going on from France to visit the three Western zones of Germany, I came back through Holland to Belgium in the last week of my tour of investigation. In Brussels I had talks with the new Minister of Defense, Moreau de Melen, and the Chiefs of the General Staff and the Air Staff, Generals Baele and Leboutte. They were both open-minded and bracingly realistic. (So was General Van der Kroon, the Dutch Assistant Chief of Staff at Western Union head-

quarters, whom I had met earlier.) I also saw Paul-Henri Spaak, the former Belgian Prime Minister, who is President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe; he talked to me at length of the need for a "European" Minister of Defense, and the formation of a European army.

In detail the reconstruction of the Belgian forces has gone well, and in quality they are better than before the war. French and British experts had already spoken to me of this, with high praise of the new training methods in both the Army and the Air Force. Indeed, the Air Force is probably the best of those on the Continent relatively to the size of the country. At the same time Belgium has been spending a smaller proportion of the national income on defense than any of her neighbors—so she could afford a bigger outlay to get bigger results. The government shows reluctance to increase the proportion of professional soldiers, since conscripts are paid only 300 francs a month (\$6), whereas professionals have to be paid upwards of 3,000 francs. Yet an increase of professionals would make a great difference to the prospect of having more divisions in a state of readiness; at present there is only one, and that is not at full strength. But even if the Belgians make as big an effort as the French are now proposing to do, their ceiling would hardly be more than four or five ready-for-action divisions.

While Holland, on the basis of population, should be able to contribute a similar number, the prospect of her actually being able to do so is dimmer. She is already devoting a larger proportion (eight percent) of her national income to defense than her neighbors, and as much in proportion as Britain is doing. But most of her effort is absorbed by the troubles in Indonesia, and it is unsafe to reckon on a lessening of the Far Eastern strain that would enable her to concentrate her full possible strength in the West.

In sum, it is hard to see how anything approaching the figure of 50 active divisions for the covering force in Western Europe could be produced from the present contributors—France, Britain, Belgium, Holland and the USA. Even with the much expanded program now contemplated, it would be remarkable if more than two-thirds of that requirement were attained in the next three years.

Besides the numerical deficiency, there is a psychological one of fundamental importance. It is doubtful whether the French have sufficient confidence in themselves, and only too clear that their neighbors lack confidence in French capacity to fill effectively the main role in Western Europe's defense. In this respect some of the opinions I heard during my tour were more revealing, and disturbing, than the ones I have mentioned.

It is not easy to gauge how the French Army and

people would stand the strain of a fresh invasion, especially a Russian invasion. As a result of General de Lattre's reforming energy and imagination as Inspector-General after the war, the French Army's basic training is now probably the best in the world. From what I have seen and heard, his system of "Light Camps"—to which young men go for the first six weeks of their conscript service—has borne good fruit and done much to create a new spirit of initiative and self-confidence in the rising generation. On the other hand, the second six months, spent with nominally active units, is apt to have a damping effect because of the all too evident lack of efficient modern equipment. That trouble may be remedied in time, as newer weapons are provided. But the young soldiers may still be infected by the inward distrust and defeatism that are widespread among the older generation.

Much would depend on the circumstances in which another war started. If the French felt that they were being drawn into war needlessly over some indirect issue or called on to fight without a reasonable chance of success, national morale would be weakened and disunity fostered. Their spirits would be likely to droop from the start.

It thus becomes all the more important to make up the numerical deficiency in Western defense if a moral deficiency is to be prevented. Unless America and Britain can station many more divisions on the Continent than seems likely, the only way that the gap could be filled is with Germans. That hard fact has become uncomfortably clear.

Yet at the time I was in Paris, just before Korea, hardly anyone in political circles was willing to contemplate such a step, far less to take it. They were reluctant even to discuss it.

In the neighboring countries, people are franker. It was made plain to me that most of them have come to recognize the necessity of bringing the Germans into Western Europe's defense. The Dutch seem even more definite on this score than the Belgians, although they suffered worse at the hands of the Germans in the war. While both the Belgians and the Dutch are fully aware of the possible threat a rearmed Germany would constitute, they feel that it is the lesser of two evils.

At the same time they consider, as did Reynaud, that the lesser risk could be diminished by bringing the Germans into a unified Western force, rather than sanctioning a separate German Army. That is probably the underlying reason why Churchill's resolution proposing the immediate creation of a "European Army" received such general support in the Assembly of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg—89 votes in its favor to five against.

What do the Germans feel about it? That no less important question will be discussed in my next article.

HAROLD L. ICKES: Harry S. Truman Is President

IN ADMIRABLE TRAIT of President Truman is his determination to be President in fact as well as in name. He has not even hesitated to crack down on General Douglas MacArthur, for whom the old adage, "Give an inch, he'll take an ell," was not coined, but might have been. Arrogant and willful, at times he acts like a spoiled child. A constant disposition, which asserts itself at inopportune moments, is to regard himself as a superman. Unfortunately, those who have his ear are mostly sycophants who play up to his overweening self-esteem. He is one who takes, without even a grain of salt, the flattery of inferiors. Why should he not believe himself to be the outstanding statesman of his generation; why should not he consider himself the greatest general of all time, not even excluding Caesar and Hannibal and Napoleon, to say nothing of modern military greats? He would only be keeping step with unbalanced hero worshipers, both juveniles and dotards.

MacArthur's insolence in intervening in Formosa after President Truman, within his constitutional powers, had determined American policy, was so outrageous that every real American should have resented it. But this was not to be. There were those who were apparently determined to prove that we are not a people under self-chosen leadership, but a mob. It is clear now that in some directions politics has reached the sewer level. Thanks to McCarthyism and—equally evil, although different in form—McCarranism, the time has come when American politics is in need of the activated sludge treatment that is given in modern cities to raw sewage. Supporters of MacArthur lost no time in beclouding the American atmosphere with praise of an insubordinate general and execration of a President who at least had enough regard for our institutions to shrink MacArthur back to size. Sane Americans may be thankful that President Truman has too much respect for the Constitution to allow it to be desecrated by a swaggering brass hat who for many years has been too big for his breeches.

Senator Knowland of California may accuse the Administration of "gagging" MacArthur. According to him, the President's order to MacArthur to withdraw an impertinent and subversive message to the VFW convention in Chicago was "another in the long series of efforts to keep the truth from the American people." Just what may be the truth with respect to Formosa, God alone knows, and it would be presumptuous, if not impious, for Knowland to presume that God had chosen to impart the truth either to him or to MacArthur, while denying it to President Truman, who alone among the American people is in a position to give human expression to that truth. But even if an inspiration was vouch-

safed from on high to Knowland and MacArthur, who could be persuaded that such a man as McCarran would be included among the confidants of the Almighty? Nor are these the only ones who have attacked the President in unsavory fashion for as timely and dignified an act as an American President has ever performed. Others have already joined the poisonous clique and still more will inevitably follow. As this is being written, Senators Brewster and Mundt have stuck their heads out of the political rat hole to anathematize their President at a time when every decent American should be applauding him instinctively for acting like a President.

That more will follow is a matter of course. This is a campaign year in which many unscrupulous politicians are determined to hold onto, or achieve, power at whatever cost. One would not criticize a legitimate aspiration to public office that would confine itself to issues and principles. Accustomed as we are to campaigns of misrepresentation and vituperation, one would not even complain too much of bitter campaigns heavily loaded with personal abuse and character assassination. But the MacArthur-inspired campaign is not against President Truman as a person. It is a blow aimed at Americanism itself. It is an attack upon American institutions and the American Constitution. It is a divisive movement, arraying brother against brother. It is such an effort as all native Communists, put together and multiplied by ten, could not have accomplished in the interest of the Kremlin.

Official Washington attempted to gloss over the damning fact that a short time ago MacArthur, without authority, flew to Formosa to confer with Chiang Kai-shek and gallantly to kiss the hand of his wife. What promises he made to Chiang have not been made public. At the time, he was commanding officer in the Far East of the United Nations forces fighting in Korea; he should have been disciplined by the United Nations and recalled by his own Commander-in-Chief. Apparently, the absence of deserved censure or much-needed discipline on that occasion emboldened MacArthur to a further and more defiant act of insubordination, which no self-respecting President could overlook. President Truman's prompt and effective move showed that he was fully aware of the seriousness of MacArthur's offense.

Whatever America may possess in Army officers who have political aspirations and in spoilsmen who follow the instincts of rodents, we can at least pride ourselves upon the fact that in Harry S. Truman we have a President.

HAROLD L. ICKES

BOOKS IN REVIEW

TWO RECENT VIEWS ON WHY THE RUSSIANS BEHAVE LIKE RUSSIANS

AGITPROP

by Julian Towster

THIS BOOK is a study of the techniques and instrumentalities employed in the USSR to indoctrinate the citizenry in the Communist faith and to gain popular acceptance, or acquiescence, for the Party's policies. In view of the paucity of materials in English on the Soviet system of propaganda and political education, the Russian Research Center at

PUBLIC OPINION IN SOVIET RUSSIA, by Alex Inkeles (Harvard University Press; \$5).

Harvard has performed a useful service in publishing this documented survey.

Time was when one could conclude with much justification that—to use the apt statement of Hans Speier—"In democracy . . . propaganda passes for an infringement of the basic individual rights of man. The propagandist, endeavoring to blind the thinking citizen, is forced in strong democracies to run his business in secret. . . . Under dictatorship, however, propaganda is legitimate." Under the impact of the critical events of recent years this conception has perforce receded into the background. It has become increasingly evident that in the present epoch words speak at least as loud as action and that, for reasons of self-preservation if for no other, a more serious effort will have to be made by the democracies of the West to explain their principles and policies to the rest of the world—including the Soviet sphere—and to dispel the gross misconceptions planted by Communist propaganda.

Two things are quite clear by now: in order to reach some of the elite behind the Iron Curtain, we must constantly bear in mind the fundamentals, alterations and rationalizations of Soviet political theory; and to devise a proper approach to the peoples concerned, we must have the widest possible understanding of the means and methods which are utilized by the Communist leaders in order to capture the

allegiance of the masses. Inkeles makes a contribution to the second task.

His book describes in great detail the media of mass communications in the USSR: the press, radio, film and oral agitation, and it relates them to the social system and to the Soviet concepts of public opinion and of interaction between the masses and the leaders. It throws light on the deliberate distinction drawn between propaganda and agitation—the first aimed chiefly at the elite, the second at the broad popular masses—on the reasons for the stress on oral agitation, on the attraction of the intelligentsia to agitation work, and a number of other subjects. The interesting explanation is offered that the reason for the Party's shifting of emphasis from study circles to individual study in the late thirties, when the intelligentsia became the main object of its political indoctrination, was the fear that while discussions on doctrine in the study circles were all right for the unsophisticated workers, such relatively uncontrolled exchanges of views by intellectuals might lead to dangerous deviations from accepted interpretations.

The author shows how the plight of the rank-and-file agitator, caught between the hammer of the Party's speed-up production norms and other unpopular measures and the anvil of possible estrangement from his fellow workers, has been increasingly solved by the appointment as agitators of the plant managers themselves. Inkeles points out that in such cases social distance makes the manager-agitator relatively immune to ostracism, while his professional competence and hierarchical position endow him with sufficient authority to be listened to by his audience. He might have added that there is also a political purpose behind this solution: enlisting the manager as agitator serves to identify him even more with the regime and tends to bind his interests to the maintenance and survival of the latter.

Inkeles' book is full of statistics on propaganda literature, party schools,

(Continued on page 20)

BENT TWIGS

by Patrick Mullahy

THIS COLLABORATION is the work of Dr. Geoffrey Gorer, the English anthropologist, and Dr. John Rickman, a psychoanalyst. Except for the Introduction, written by Gorer, the first part of the book is composed of *Ten Sketches of Russian Peasant Life*, originally published some years ago by Rickman. They are based on his experiences in Russia between 1916 and 1918 as a country doctor.

These sketches are brilliantly written, and they read like a skillfully contrived and absorbing short story. But while Gorer seems to think that they throw light on the thesis he is trying to maintain, I fail to see it.

The main part of the book, written by Gorer, is the result of his participa-

THE PEOPLE OF GREAT RUSSIA. A Psychological Study by Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman (Chanticleer Press, Inc.; \$3).

tion in a Research Project on Contemporary Cultures organized in 1947 by the late Dr. Ruth Benedict, at Columbia University, where he obtained much of his material. He acquired none of it from direct contact with the present inhabitants of Great Russia. The study is confined "exclusively to the people of Great Russia, inhabiting that area of Russia corresponding to the Soviet Great Russian Republic and having Russian as their mother-tongue." Gorer says that, according to the Soviet census of 1930, these people represent about half the population of the USSR.

While he acknowledges their importance, Gorer does not discuss the history or the economic, political and social organization of Great Russia, save incidentally, nor attempt to show their role in the character formation of Great Russians because, he says, he does not feel competent to do so. In addition, the greater part of his "most concrete material dates back twenty years or more." And he assumes that the "gen-

eral pattern of living," among other things, of the peasants has probably changed very little during that period.

Gorer is primarily concerned with the way in which Great Russian peasant children are reared, especially in infancy, and the effects this has on subsequent psychological development and behavior. According to him, from "the day of its birth onwards the baby is tightly swaddled in long strips of material, holding its legs straight and its arms down by its sides." The swaddling lasts, as a rule, for about nine months. "The baby is unswaddled," he continues, "and wrapped in a loose shawl, for nursing unless the mother is too busy, and for occasional bathing in carefully adjusted tepid water, but for no other reason."

Now what is the significance of this? Gorer's answer is diffuse, vague and contradictory, but I think I can untangle at least part of it. He *assumes* that "this inhibition of movement is felt to be extremely painful and frustrating and is responded to with intense and destructive rage, which cannot be adequately expressed physically." The rage is said to be aimed at the constraint, not at the people who impose it. Presumably because of the infant's "omnipotence of thought" (a psychoanalytic concept), "the assumed destructive rage would appear to give the infant a feeling of overwhelming destructive strength."

Also, the infant "projects" his own hostile wishes onto the "vague figures" in the environment whom he then fears. Apparently he physically and psychologically exhausts himself with unassuaged rage, with a resulting feeling of impotence and depression or its analogue. Gorer thinks it probable that the infant considers the depressions to be produced by the external world as a retaliation for his own hostile wishes. An unconscious fear of return to infantile depression is said to remain operative in adult life.

As a result of his rages and fears, the infant develops a feeling of pervasive though "unfocused" guilt. "So pervasive is this unfocused guilt for some Russians that they can (or did) feel responsible for the sins and miseries of the whole world. . . ." Gorer attempts, at least by implication, to explain by

swaddling the sudden switches of Russian soldiers from thieving, brutality and rape to "kindness."

If his hypotheses are correct, Gorer says, "it will follow that the majority of Great Russians have a diffuse feeling of guilt, which is largely or entirely unconscious, and a diffuse feeling of fear, derived from the projection of their infantile hostility. This fear would appear to take the form of an emotional conviction that there exists in the external world an enemy (or enemies) who plan to constrict and destroy them, but no sort of certainty concerning the identity of the enemy."

Gorer's analysis explicitly carries through the swaddling analogy in regard to authority: it must be, or should be, firm and consistent, not too tight, nor too loose, etc. The Great Russians, because of their unconscious hostility and guilt, Gorer hypothesizes, need to have at least one figure who has no human frailties, who represents the "idealized self," a Leader to save them from political anarchy and personal disintegration, whom they will follow to the death. There are other ramifications which I have not the space to discuss.

However, we are warned that the swaddling hypothesis is only "one of the major determinants in the development of the character of adult Great Russians." And in the next paragraph we are told that "it is not intended to imply that Russian character would be changed or modified if some other technique of infant training were adopted. Swaddling is one of the devices which Russian adults employ to communicate with the child in its first year of life, to lay the foundation for those habits and attitudes which will subsequently be developed and strengthened by all the major institutions in Great Russian society." Swaddling is only a "clew" or a labyrinthine thread to the interpretation of Russian character and behavior—whatever that means—not a cause.

Here Gorer has unwittingly admitted that his theories cannot even partially explain the development of Russian character and behavior. If it is not meant that Russian character would be changed by some other technique of infant training, we must look elsewhere for the distinctive causal conditions of Russian character and character development. And this would seem to be

primarily to the "major institutions of Great Russian society" which develop and strengthen the habits and attitudes of Great Russians. Personally, I doubt that the swaddling hypothesis explains or clarifies anything, or even serves as a clue, but in any case, it does not explain or clarify what Gorer thinks it does.

There is a final chapter in which certain political maxims are set forth. These are in the main, I surmise, sound, but they do not logically depend upon a swaddling hypothesis.

Patrick Mullahy, lecturer in philosophy at Columbia University, is the author of Oedipus—Myth and Complex and the editor of A Study of Interpersonal Relations.

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(Continued from page 18)

film attendance, broadcasts and other facets of the Soviet propaganda effort. Some idea of its dimensions may be gained from such figures as the publication of 737 million copies of books and pamphlets on "Marxism-Leninism" during 1917-47 and the regular maintenance of some two million agitators in daily operation. Other figures point up marked weaknesses in the propaganda machine. In the mid-thirties the USSR had a total of 2.3 million regular radio sets and wired speakers, *i.e.*, about one for every 75 persons in the Soviet Union, as compared with 25.5 million sets, or one for every six persons, in North America. By early 1949 there were only about 10 million wired speakers and radio sets for the entire USSR. Moreover, of all this equipment, fewer than 20 percent (1,300,000 sets) were regular radios; the rest were wired speakers whose reception is at all times under absolute control by the central government stations. These facts and figures are of distinct relevance for our counter-propaganda effort, since it is obvious that as far as the USSR itself is concerned, a mere increase in Western transmitters and broadcasts is unlikely to solve the problem of "reaching the largest number most rapidly."

Finally, on the crucial question of the effectiveness of Soviet internal propaganda, Inkeles reaches the balanced conclusion that the very magnitude and persistence of the Soviet effort suggest a lingering fear on the part of the leaders that many citizens remain to be convinced, and that despite its imposing organization, the Soviet propaganda system "is far from completely successful and is far below the level of effectiveness that the Soviet leaders would like to see it attain."

The book is not without a number of shortcomings. Some of the author's emphases are misplaced. It is quite proper, for example, to point out the role of "self-criticism" by the masses as a psychological safety-valve, permitting a degree of politically harmless discharge of personal aggressiveness bred in individuals by repeated privations. But Inkeles has a rather exaggerated notion of the effectiveness of such "self-criticism" as an instrument of popular control or "supervision" of the bureaucracy.

The book is oversophisticated and too wordy in places. One can hardly expect in a scholarly treatise the kind of lucid language which one finds, let us say, in Edmund Stevens' recent articles in the *Christian Science Monitor* on Soviet propaganda—articles which, based as they are on keen, first-hand observation, make an excellent complement to some of Inkeles' chapters. Even so, the presentation would have benefited from somewhat clearer language and less repetitiousness. Again, while an author is entitled to set the limits of his study, teachers of specialized courses on Russia, as well as propaganda analysts, will regret the absence of any treatment of the stereotypes and basic themes of Soviet foreign and domestic propaganda, of any analysis of the semantics of the Soviet propaganda output, of any extended consideration of Soviet posters and cartoons—and last but not least, of any attempt to discuss the role of popular humor as one of the true indicators of public opinion in the USSR.

For all that, Alex Inkeles has written a conscientious and informative book. Serious students of the USSR will read it with profit.

Julian Towster is the author of *Political Power in the USSR*. He was a Senior Fellow at Columbia University's Russian Institute and is now on the Political Science staff of the University of California.

AMERICANS IN ENGLAND

ASSIGNMENT TO AUSTERITY: AN AMERICAN FAMILY IN BRITAIN, by Herbert and Nancie Matthews (Bobbs-Merrill; \$3).

HERBERT MATTHEWS has come back from *Assignment to Austerity* with the presently unpopular view that socialism in Britain isn't going to mean the end of British liberties. It isn't that he necessarily believes socialism and freedom are compatible, but rather that "British freedom will be saved by British character and in spite of Socialism, not because of it." While he thinks that the Welfare State has come to stay in Britain and that the British Tories will have to support it no less than the Labour Party, Matthews is by no means a socialist. He is a reporter who states the facts as he understands them, whether or not they fit into today's battle against "regimentation."

Unfortunately, *Assignment to Auster-*

ity does not give the feeling of a great people making a profoundly important experiment in human relations. Nor does Matthews ever satisfy you that he has dug very far beneath the political surface to analyze what is happening in Britain. He leaves many questions unanswered. Coal has been nationalized and the Labour Government is having its troubles with it. Unwillingness of the miner to work too hard, one of the chief reasons given by Matthews, undoubtedly is part of the explanation. But I would have appreciated a more substantial background: the state of the coal industry when Labour took over, the compensation paid to private owners for their shares, the drag on the nation's income that these shares represent.

Nancie, Matthews' wife, is co-author and contributes a series of chapters on problems of the home, rationing, "austerity" in terms of domestic life. I found this section rather querulous, though filled with interesting material. It is conceivable that austerity might have been treated as a great adventure in the determination of a people to "share and share alike" in the greater interest of their nation. I am afraid that I could not detect much of this note.

The book is well worth reading as an intelligent report of Britain during the past five years, but it suffers from too meticulous an analysis of political events without a corresponding study of the causes behind today's British experiment.

ALEXANDER H. UHL

CRITICAL AUSTERITY

COLLECTED IMPRESSIONS, by Elizabeth Bowen (Alfred A. Knopf; \$3.50).

THE PENULTIMATE PIECE in Elizabeth Bowen's *Collected Impressions* is her "Notes on Writing a Novel," a set of rules for the novelist, written in the four-square style of the laboratory manual. It is slow reading. This crowded, unadorned treatment of the fluid interplay of impressions, memory and imagination, of the charged interrelationships of character, plot, dialogue, scene and tempo, is clearly the result of years of disciplined work, and requires study. It is, however, an awesome structure that teeters on a fragile hypothesis, not necessarily untrue but insufficiently clarified. Miss Bowen denies the validity

of all themes (here called "pre-assumptions—social, political, sexual, national, aesthetic and so-on") which are not 'poetic truth.' But what is that? Whose truth is it? Are there truths, unmistakably and universally poetic? We are not told.

"Notes" sounds the key for much of the matter in a book which, though it contains sketches of persons and places, of schoolday recollections, is mainly a series of literary evaluations. The work of E. M. Forster, of Ivy Compton-Burnett, of Virginia Woolf, D. H. Lawrence, Le Fanu and others is explored with clarity and insight and set down in a strong, graceful style. Richly varied restatements of Miss Bowen's tenets (akin to the detached, Olympian principles of Flaubert, whom she discusses at some length) appear in these essays as, for instance, in the preface to *The Faber Book of Modern Short Stories*: "The subject must have implicit dignity." "It [the short story] can, while remaining rightly prosaic and circumstantial, give scene, action, event, character a poetic new actuality." In a review of a new edition of Ben Jonson's plays we find: "There must be in literature the mind's disengaged comment on engaged emotion."

Her austere, cerebral approach, her acceptance of perception only after it has been through the creative crucible, seem to remove her from humanity to the point where her sketches concerned directly with people have too cool a quality. Soldiers driving through Folkestone, people emerging from bomb cellars, mooning schoolgirls, are all seen as through a precision instrument which affords a clear but distant view.

Miss Bowen's reviews of books make wonderful reading and are totally out of balance. As might be expected, her great talent interferes with her ability to do an ordinary workmanlike review. The fine analysis and imagination she invests create an effulgence around a book which, one suspects, may not be native to it. Sometimes the matter of a book so interests her that, leaving book and author standing outside, she invites the reader to a beautiful little essay of her own. Her sureness, her ability to tighten sprawling material into the one perfect phrase, often give the feeling that she has more skillfully exposed another's material than he may have

done himself. In a review of a biography of Lady Burton, Miss Bowen says, "She became a brilliant, hypnotic bore," which efficiently opens and closes that subject. To be reviewed by Miss Bowen

must be a formidable experience, flattering and terrifying. KATE SIMON

Kate Simon has worked for the Book-of-the-Month Club and the Limited Editions Club. She is now a free-lance reviewer.

MOVIES: End of Summer

THERE ARE COMEDIANS who can appear lonely and empty-handed before an audience and with a gesture or a word make adoring slaves of everyone present. Bob Hope is not of that company; a successful Hope expedition into the theatre is a safari of assorted talents, and the star himself is the outlet and focus for their anonymous contributions. He is an excellently sensitive medium, to be sure, but he is not a one-man circus. This is not entirely a matter of quality (though quality bears on it); it is also a question of the approach to humor. I have been over this ground before: the main point is that Hope's funniness is specific, unreflective and immediate. You can run into the sons and brothers of Savo, Fernandel or Fields anywhere you go; they are types of behavior. But if you see anyone who reminds you of Hope it is undoubtedly because he is imitating him.

In "Fancy Pants," his new picture, Hope works as hard as he ever has in his career. The labor is not entirely in

vain, for he achieves some genuine absurdities, but it is too heavy by far for the return. There is no wit in the script (a shabby rewrite of *Ruggles of Red Gap*) and there is no one present in the cast to volley his gags. A comedian should not be asked to make bricks without straw unless he has a talent for that difficult work.

Lucille Ball assists Hope by trying, unsuccessfully, to ape Betty Hutton; Eric Blore disappears from the story too soon; and Bing Crosby is as conspicuously absent as Hope has been from Crosby's recent pictures.

Good films are not made from bad conscience and self-exculpation does not provide an attractive theme. Probably there is no one today who would hold that all Italians were Fascists, but "Difficult Years," a recent import, suggests that most of them were stupid, supine or venal. It is a tedious, over-simplified, predictable account of how Mussolini's total state destroyed one of its most in-

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offensive citizens, a government clerk of such exquisite spinelessness that he would scarcely have preserved his dignity in Utopia.

Umberto Spadaro plays this feckless role with a dejection that extends from his drooping mustaches to his unlocked knees. For what it is, the portrait is perfect, but the sorrows of a human blanc mange are insufficiently poignant to keep an audience awake and the sin of Fascism is not that it used as doormats persons suitable for nothing else. The other members of the cast are all what public-relations jargon calls black or white symbols, an assortment of ethical lamb chops that are instantly recognizable, easily prepared and readily digested. The only sections of the film that caused a flicker of interest are those displaying a group of liberal intellectuals obsessively engaged in proving their foresight by hindsight; they are an uncomfortably familiar pack of chatterers.

"Difficult Years" was directed by Luigi Zampa, who made "To Live in Peace," a much better film of related content.

A farce version of the Enoch Arden theme has been employed in a second Italian picture, "My Widow and I," to provide a romp for Vittorio de Sica and Isa Miranda. De Sica is a great director ("Bicycle Thief") and it is strange that he should become involved in any capacity in a work so amiably anemic. He and Miss Miranda (seen here recently in "Walls of Malapaga") spend a good part of the time gazing at each other with a hopeless perplexity from which the script never rescues them.

Robert Montgomery's new detective story, "Eye Witness," is not a very nourishing dish, but it contains one winning ingredient: the rueful perplexity of Americans and Englishmen when they are confronted with each other's speech, custom and understanding of what is fitting. "Eye Witness" is an international collaboration, filmed in England; it quite properly advances the theory that Anglo-American affection grows by what it feeds upon. The theme is developed with a minimum amount of suspense but a lot of good humor.

Montgomery, director as well as star, plays a Perry Mason sort of New York

lawyer-sleuth who returns to an English hamlet to rescue from the gallows a youngster who had saved his life at Anzio. He knows little and cares nothing about English legal procedure, but he is sensitive to the smell of rats and produces a rather gamy specimen at the eleventh hour. For the purposes

of accenting Montgomery's Yankee verve, the British are made out to be improbably obtuse and unenterprising, and the fact that the dead man was a groom named Lawrence awakens literary echoes that should make any alert spectator view the ladies of the manor with a fishy eye.

ROBERT HATCH

ON THE AIR: Trial by Sponsor

ON SUNDAY, August 27, the television version of "The Aldrich Family" was scheduled to help open NBC-TV's new season. But Henry and Homer and their group of gangling adolescents at perpetual war with the older generation didn't make it. Television viewers heard, instead, a discussion of the Korean situation, saw travel films straight out of the stockroom. Someone had raised a fuss about the assignment of the role of Mother Aldrich to Jean Muir, an actress of twenty years' experience, and she was immediately locked out of the Aldrich house. NBC, the advertising agency (Young & Rubicam), and the sponsor (General Foods Corporation) had received twenty phone calls and two telegrams denouncing Miss Muir. It's not clear, even now, what the denunciations entailed. No one called her a Communist. No one even called her a fellow traveler. But someone had said "boo," and for stalwart organizations like NBC, Y & R, and General Foods that was quite enough. *Red Channels*, a book published by a couple of ex-agents of the FBI who put out a weekly newsletter called *Counter-attack*, had listed Miss Muir as having belonged to certain organizations. And who today dares to argue with a sheet whose stated mission is to supply "facts to combat Communism"?

I talked to Miss Muir. "All I want," she said, "is the right to work. My feeling is one of complete heart-sickness. I feel as though I had undergone an amputation—the amputation of one's self. The theatre is my only outlet; it is the only life I have known for twenty years. I cannot believe it is possible that now I shall never work in the theatre again. I want a job. That would be the only refutation of these charges against me."

For a year there has been talk in radio and television about the existence of a blacklist. Everybody in authority denied its existence, but signs that it did exist began to appear. A prominent actor (I shall not name here anyone whose name has not already been smeared) was scheduled to go on TV as star of a new series of dramatic programs. Suddenly, the sponsor informed the producer—in this case, an independent "package" house—that the deal was off because the actor was accused of being Red. The producer asked for proof, but was told that none was needed. The sponsor finally agreed to go through with the contract, *if* the network which was to broadcast the show would clear the actor. The network passed the buck, saying the actor was OK with them if he was OK with the sponsor. The deal was called off.

Some months later a former president of the Radio and Television Directors Guild was fired. He had been employed for several years as director of "Gangbusters" and "Counterspy." His name is William Sweets and he was kicked out of his job because someone said he was a Red. No proof was needed.

Finally, the blacklist came to life. *Red Channels* mentions comedians, composers, playwrights, orchestra leaders, as well as people whose connection with show business of any type is remote. It's a hodgepodge of information based, allegedly, on the records of various national and state committees like the old Dies Committee and the Tenney Committee in California. Miss Muir's name is on the list.

Miss Muir denies that she was or is a Communist or ever joined any of the nine organizations to which *Red Channels* says she has belonged. Further-

more, several of these organizations are not usually considered Communist-dominated, although others are accepted as being in that category. But General Foods, which sells Jello through the Aldrich show, is not interested in the merits of the charges against Miss Muir. In a formal statement, the firm declared:

"General Food advertising . . . avoids the use of material and personalities which, in its judgment, are controversial." But leper though she now becomes, Miss Muir was paid in full for 18 weeks on the air. A suit for breach of contract might also have been controversial.

A few months ago, Joseph McConnell, president of NBC, took a courageous step in a similar situation. Some people had written in, protesting NBC's employment of a certain actor smeared by *Counterattack*. McConnell wrote back, declaring that NBC would not take "unilateral" action against a man labeled by accusers offering no valid proof. *Counterattack* immediately assailed McConnell. Niles Trammell, NBC board chairman, appeared a couple of weeks later as feature speaker before the graduating class of the FBI National Academy. I commend the coincidence not only to Miss Muir but to others in the entertainment profession as well as to the radio and television audience.

Jack Gould of the *New York Times* quotes a "responsible" broadcasting executive as saying that "the *Red Channels* book is now the Bible up and down Madison Avenue." And in the same article Theodore Kirkpatrick, co-editor of *Counterattack*, describes the two methods by which one may have one's name removed from *Red Channels*: (1) join or work for organizations which he and his colleagues consider sufficiently "pro-American"; (2) appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee and make a public confession. Confession of what? Well, a man who has no other sins on his soul can at least admit to being controversial. In that way he might not save his job, but he will have helped *Counterattack* retain its reputation for rectitude. Isn't that the most important cause of all now?

SAUL CARSON

(Continued from page 4)

Europe or Asia, but here, too, the seeds are being sown. . . .

We must realize that democracy is not merely the imposition on another country of the forms of government which we have chosen for ourselves, but rather the making possible for oppressed people, whether they be oppressed by a foreign power or their own rulers, to evolve that system of life which they desire.

This may well mean, and in many countries undoubtedly does mean, the curtailment of many of those things which people in the United States and in Great Britain hold dear, such as private enterprise in industry, the private ownership of land and perhaps even the freedom of the press. We are—or at least we hope we are—sufficiently mature not to abuse these privileges, but in many other countries of the world private enterprise means that a small and unscrupulous group of businessmen can gain absolute control of the economy of the country, private ownership of land may mean that millions of hard-working peasants are no better than the slaves of bankers and landowners, and a press uncontrolled by the government may mean that the population has no more chance of reading conflicting views than it could in Nazi Germany or can in Communist Russia.

People who for centuries have lived in conditions of economic slavery cannot, in a few short years, be emancipated to such an extent as to bring them to a stage of development comparable with our own. If we try to do this we shall find that democracy is no more than a cloak made use of by feudal landowners and merchant princes. What is more, we shall find ourselves perhaps unconsciously and certainly unwillingly supporting these reactionary dictators merely because we are determined to oppose the dictatorship of Communism. When this occurs we deprive ourselves of the help of those millions whose lot we want to improve.

The cold war will be won by whichever side can gain the support of the peasant. In Eastern Europe the first round went to Russia, in China the Soviets won the second round, and in the third round they are at the moment leading on points; but if we are prepared to learn by our failures of the past, if we are prepared to devote as much time to the study of world peasant problems as we are to the study of military strategy, we shall still win. Even where the West has won—in Berlin with the air lift, in Greece, in Italy and in Western Germany—the victory has been a purely defensive one; we have repelled the attack but we have not followed it up. . . . No war, not even a cold war, can be won by defense alone. . . .

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